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  ABSTRACT 
 
This  paper  consists  of  a  comparative  study  of  public  financing  of  NGO 
development cooperation in selected European countries. The study encompasses the Nordic+ 
group (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland) 
and Switzerland. Its main objective is to find out whether and how in the countries studied the 
modalities and objectives  of the subsidization of Northern NGOs have been adapted to the 
rationale  and  requirements  of  the  new  aid  approach  as  embodied  in  the  2005  DAC  Paris 
Declaration.    We  describe  the  evolutions  in  the  volumes,  the  procedures  and  modalities  of 
funding to Northern NGOs, We argue that remarkable changes have been made in co-financing 
of development NGOs and give an analysis of the underlying rationale of these reforms. The 
annex to this paper contains the full version of the country studies. 
 
  




Cette publication  consiste  d'une  étude  comparative  du  financement  public  de  la 
coopération au développement des ONG dans une sélection de pays européens. La recherche 
comprend le groupe Nordic + (Danemark, Finlande, Norvège, Suède, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni 
et l'Irlande) et la Suisse. Son objectif principal est de découvrir si et comment les modalités et 
objectifs du financement des ONG du Nord dans les pays étudiés ont étés adaptés à la logique 
et les exigences de la nouvelle approche de l'aide énoncés dans la Déclaration de Paris de 
2005. Nous décrivons les évolutions dans les volumes, procédures et modalités du financement 
des ONG du Nord. Nous argumentons que des changements substantiels se sont produits dans 
le cofinancement des ONG de développement et nous fournissons une analyse de la logique 
sous-jacente de ces réformes. L'annexe de cette publication contient la version complète des 
études de pays.  
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This  paper  consists  of  a  comparative  study  of  public  financing  of  NGO 
development cooperation in selected European countries. The main aim of this paper is to find 
out whether and how in the countries studied the modalities and objectives of the subsidization 
of  Northern  NGOs  have  been  adapted  to  the  rationale  and  requirements  of  the  new  aid 
approach.  We try to find out what recommendations have come out of evaluations and reports 
made for this purpose, what changes have actually been implemented, and how these changes 
are in line with the DAC 2005 Paris Declaration and the 2008 follow-up High Level Meeting in 
Accra. The report was commissioned by the Directorate General for Development Co-operation 
(DGDC) of the federal government of Belgium to provide ideas for the ongoing debate on co-
financing  reform  in  Belgium,  and  for  this  reason  the  findings  are  sometimes compared  and 
contrasted with the Belgian situation. 
 
This study encompasses the Nordic+ group (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland) as these countries have been forerunners 
concerning the reform of their development aid in the light of aid effectiveness. We also study 
the case of Switzerland, because of the interesting studies and policy debates on NGO funding 
in this country and also because of some similarities with our own country, Belgium, in size and 
political/social structure. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we briefly comment on evolutions  
in  the  volumes  of  funding  to  Northern  NGOs.  Section  3  consists  of  a  description  of  the 
procedures and modalities of NGO funding in the countries studied. Studies and evaluations 
from the late 1990s onwards point to a same set of basic challenges, and policy reforms in the 
countries studied provide surprisingly similar answers. In section 4 we describe the underlying 
logic of these reforms. We argue that slowly but surely, an evolution has taken place in public 
funding  of  NGOs.  In  some  countries  this  has  entailed  sharp  policy  changes,  in  others  the 
adjustments have been more gradual. But the changes in these aid agencies‟ policies all point 
in the same direction. The emerging strategy seems to be that NGOs (1) must act in synergy 
with bilateral aid and contribute to an overall aid strategy that is consonant with the international 
consensus  on  good  donorship  (Paris  Declaration),  (2)  that  they  are  recognised  as  being 
different from bilateral donors and are expected to perform specific and autonomous roles, and 
(3) that co-financing is not an historical entitlement for long-term NGO partners of the public 
system and that funds will be allocated on a competitive basis, with winners and losers. The 
reforms have been widely discussed with NGOs, but bilateral donors have taken the initiative 
everywhere and are very much in the driver seat. The new strategy does not imply that bilateral 
donors necessarily wish to diminish the share of aid allocated through the NGOs. If anything, 
the message is that, even if the roles of NGOs that are being funded are defined more precisely 
and  NGOs  must  accept  more  competition,  funding  to  NGOs  will  remain  important.  After 
presenting the rationale of this evolving strategy on the funding of NGOs, we point to some 
unresolved issues, and we speculate about whether further reforms are likely. 
 
The annex, which in volume constitutes the bulk of the report, contains the eight 
country briefs, and a selective bibliography.  
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We  searched  the  official  websites  of  the  donors,  where  we  looked  for  policy 
documents and evaluations, but also checked the academic literature, the DAC peer reviews 
and we consulted the DAC statistical database. It must be pointed out that, notwithstanding the 
access  to  ample  official  documentation  and  the  many  outstanding  independent  reports  and 
evaluations that we were able to consult, a desk study has clear limitations. For instance, it 
does not allow a critical assessment of the finer points of some of the reforms. Furthermore, it is 
not always easy to assess how strict official policy guidelines are being enacted. As reported in 
several evaluation reports, NGO funding in practice may well not be a full reflection of the stated 
policy.  Another weakness - this time not due to the nature of our approach - is that reliable 
comparative data on NGO funding are hard to find. The most authoritative data are published by 
the OECD/DAC. But we found surprising differences between what donors report to DAC and 
what they publish in their own documents. The problem is that NGO-funding consists of more 
than co-financing alone, and additional financing mechanisms are often scattered over different 
departments and budget lines, and are thus not identified as NGO funding in DAC statistics. 
Problematic areas are subcontracting, humanitarian aid, special thematic funds, and the funding 
of Southern NGOs. Equally problematic are the estimates of the DAC on the own funding of the 
NGOs.  These  problems  are  well  known.
1  Comparison of NGO policies is less beset by 
problems, but even here things are sometimes  complicated by the fact that donors employ 
diverging definitions and terms (Udsholt 2008). 
 
This study was finalised at the end of November 2008 and goes back to reports 
from the end of the 1990s onward. Some recent documents were received through e -mail 
contact with NGO divisions in the countries studied. It is nevertheless possible that some recent 
changes in the funding mechanisms have escaped our attention and are not included in the 
review, because the consulted information sources are not always fully  up to date while some 
documentation is not available in English.  
 
 
                                                 
1 For example, Agg (2006) uses the DAC database to assess trends in NGO funding and stumbles across 
large and apparently erratic fluctuations, which are most probably attributable to reporting inconsistencies 
rather than sudden shifts in donor spending.  
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2.   LEVEL OF FUNDING TO NORTHERN NGOS 
 
Figure 1 summarizes statistical information from the DAC regarding NGO-funding. 
In 2005-2006 the eight countries studied on average channeled almost 14% of their ODA to 
NGOs
2. This is higher than the 9% for Belgium and much higher than the average of 5% for all 
DAC members taken together. Abstracting from the different degrees of underreporting of 
humanitarian funding to and through NGOs and of direct s upport to Southern NGOs, Belgian 
NGOs get a lesser share of total ODA than their colleagues in the European countries studied 
get. However, this average is not necessarily very meaningful because of the large variation it 
hides:  in three of the countries (Denmark, Finland, and the UK) the percentage is actually lower 
than in Belgium.  
 
Taking a historical view, and comparing the data of 2005-2006 with those of 2000-
2001, at the beginning of the new aid approach, we observe an increasing share of ODA to 
NGOs in the countries studied, from 11% to 14%. By contrast, the share in Belgium has 
decreased in the same period, from 13% to 9%. We do not think too much can be read in this 
however, as the changes between the two periods sometimes seem very unlikely, e.g.   for 
Switzerland (from 9% in the earlier period to 17% in the more recent period). We suspect that 
there is a problem with the way the data have been entered into the DAC system, either 
because of unclear rules, or because of erratic shifts in the zeal wit h which data pertaining to 
NGOs have been culled from different lines of activity.
3  
 
The direct funding of Southern NGOs may well be gaining momentum. We cannot 
conclude this from DAC data, as there is no separate reporting on direct financing of Southern 
NGOs,  nor  do  donors  state  it  categorically.
4  But we infer it from what we read in many 
documents. The Netherlands have stated the intention to increase direct funding of Southern 
NGOs.  Several  Scandinavian  donors  are  also  increasingly  making  use  of  decent ralised 
financing systems in favour of Southern NGOs (Scanteam 2007).  And the same is taking place 
in the UK. It is interesting to note that in direct funding of Southern NGOs, bilateral donors are 
experimenting with financial pooling with other donors, and that support often takes the form of 
core funding. This shift to the South in co-financing mirrors the general trend in decentralisation 
from headquarters to embassies and delegations, and is made possible by the growing capacity 
of Southern NGOs. Significantly, it is also in tune with the emphasis in the new aid approach on 
downward accountability and the need to strengthen local civil society. Note that when bilateral 
                                                 
2 Or more correctly: to and through NGOs, which are separate reporting categories within the DAC 
database. Aid to NGOs suggests a considerable degree of autonomy of the NGOs in the use of aid, as in 
core funding, while aid through NGOs suggests considerable steering by the back donor, as in 
subcontracting. It would therefore have been informative to be able to rely on these data to ascertain the 
extent of freedom NGOs enjoy to use government funding. The DAC definitions of these categories are 
however somewhat fuzzy and the distinction between the categories is not very clear-cut. The problem is 
in fact that there are many categories in between those two extremes of core funding and subcontracting, 
and it is not clear how these should be reported.  Certain flexible forms of programme funding easily fit in 
the rubric „aid to NGOs‟ and are not problematic. But aid through NGOs seems to encompass such diverse 
arrangements as project co-financing schemes with right of initiative, and subcontracting to NGOs.  The 
opacity of the DAC guidelines on this matter is reflected in the apparent inconsistencies in donor reporting 
on aid to and through NGOs. The aid to/through NGO distinction consequently does not seem very useful, 
and we have added these reporting categories together in figure 1. 
3 The website of the DGDC (DGDC 2009) gives different information: in 2003 funding of Belgian NGOs 
was at 6,36% of ODA, in 2007 at 7,89%. 
4 For Belgium however, information on direct financing of Southern NGOs (DGDC 2009) is available and 
this funding seems to have hugely magnified between 2003 and 2007: from  €0,11 million (0.01% of ODA) 
to €5.01 million (0,35% of ODA). This trend does not however seem to have been at the expense of the 
funding of Belgian NGOs, which did not drop during this time period (see footnote 3).   
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donors engage in direct support of Southern NGOs, rather than do this indirectly through co-
financing of Northern NGOs, they implicitly enter in competition with Northern NGOs. In the 
longer run funding to Northern NGOs may well come under pressure if direct funding to local 
NGOs  gains  prominence  (a  fear  expressed  by  many  Northern  NGOs).  On  the  other  hand, 
bilateral  donor  agencies  also  acknowledge  the  unique  contribution  of  Northern  NGOs  in 
informing the public and creating broad support for international solidarity and public aid. None 
of the studied donors have expressed the intent to decrease funding to Northern NGOs. In fact, 
some of them (e.g. Denmark, UK, Finland, Norway) intend to increase funding to NGOs or have 

























Figure 1: Support to NGOs as % of ODA 
Source: DAC International Development Statistics Database, CRS Online5 
 
In the following table, as a complement and contrast to the DAC data, we give an 
overview of alternative data of the studied donors‟ support to Northern NGOs. This information 
is mostly compiled from official donor documents. 
 
                                                 
5 For some donors, some information on NGO-funding is missing in the DAC statistics for some years. 
When information seemed incorrect due to this lack of information, we have not included it in the 
calculation of the average and have given information only for that year for which information was 
available. 
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Table 1: Support to Northern NGOs as % of ODA 
 
Country  % of ODA through NGOs 
(donor‟s own data)6 
Denmark  6.7%7 (2007) 
Finland  12%8 (2008) 
Norway  14,3%9 (2002) 
Sweden  8% (2005)10 
Netherlands  25% (2004)11 
UK  2,25% (2005) 12 
Ireland  13,5% (2007)13 
Switzerland  6,45%14 (2007) 
Average  11,0 
 
 
3. CENTRAL FEATURES OF THE NEW APPROACH TO NGO FUNDING 
 
In table 2 the major changes in bilateral donor thinking about NGO funding are 
summarised. These developments should not be interpreted as sudden swings in policies, but 
rather as indications of the direction in which policy is evolving. As a consequence, most donors 
are to be found somewhere in the grey area in between the left and the right  columns, but 
moving towards the right.  
 
Table 2: Evolutions in bilateral thinking about NGO funding 
Before 2000  After 2000 
Relation government – NGOs 
 
Historically grown “privileged” and cosy 
relationship between a select group of NGOs 
and the bilateral aid agency  
 
 
Allocations of funding through an open and  competitive 
system ( sometimes labelled "marketisation"15) based on 
transparent criteria16 
A latent consensus on aid strategies. Many of 
the contributions of NGOs, such as pro-poor 
Thinking on a „new aid paradigm‟ mainly located within 
bilateral (like-minded countries) and multilateral agencies 
                                                 
6 We have taken care as much as possible to limit these figures to funding to Northern NGOs for structural 
development projects. This means that the data do not include humanitarian & emergency aid, direct 
support to Southern or international NGOs or subcontracting. It is however not easy to compare donor 
data and a fairly substantial margin of error must be taken into account. 
7 Danida 2008. 
8 MFA Finland 2008a.   
9 MFA Norway 2004. NGO support even surpasses direct bilateral government-to-government cooperation 
(in 2003, it amounted to 37% of Norad‟s ODA). Total funding of NGOs is at 22%, but this number includes 
support for national, international and local NGOs, and emergency relief and structural development 
cooperation. Support to Norwegian NGOs for structural development is 65% of this figure. 
10 Sida 2006 
11 Ruben & Schulpen 2008. 
12 NAO 2007. Only 25% of all NGO funding for UK NGOs structural development aid. 
13 Irish Aid 2008 
14 SDC 2008b. Includes contributions to the ICRC, so actual figure a bit lower. These figures do not 
include allocations for subcontracting. 
15 Marketisation is defined by Koch (2009:108) as “the extent to which back donors attempt to simulate 
markets in their co-financing systems […] [by] induc[ing] competition between their „contracting agencies‟”. 
16 To keep the system open to new entrants, a golden parachute is sometimes offered to NGOs that are 
phased out (Netherlands).  
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orientation and participation, have been 
mainstreamed 
(World Bank) leads to questions on service delivery 
substitution by NGOs . Many NGOs alienated from this 
evolution, and feel threatened by it.  
 
NGO funding disconnected from bilateral aid 
policy  
Formulation, after consultation with NGOs, of a 
strategy/policy that emphasises intensive and/or extensive 
complementarity17 between bilateral and NGO aid  
  
Specificity and different roles direct vs. indirect 
actors entails strict division of roles  
 
Recognition of different roles, but emphasis on synergy 
between NGOs and bilateral aid 
Dependency of NGOs on official funding not 
regarded as problematic 
Public funding dependency of NGOs regarded as unwise. 
Focus on popular support and fundraising by NGOs18  
Modalities 
Project approach is strengthened through 
approval of detailed activity descriptions (input) 
 
Programmatic approach is encouraged through broader 
agreements related to strategies and output/objectives 
Annual approval of proposals and funding 
 
Long-term funding agreements (3-6 years) 
Strong focus on ex-ante approval and output-
reporting 
Results-based management, stronger focus on M&E. NGOs 
must be able to demonstrate impact and contribution to 
official aid objectives.  
 
Detailed reporting using donor formats  Flexible reporting and less bureaucratic control to make 
flexible support to Southern NGOs possible19 
 
Exclusive administrative oversight by the 
government 
 
Some outsourcing to umbrella organisations or 
external/private companies20 
 
Emphasis on right of initiative  
 
More earmarking through special funds, and stricter 
conditions in co-financing without impinging on the right of 
initiative  
 
Administration of NGO funding mainly focused 
on financial control 
Focus on strategic policy management at macro level, 
importance of policy dialogue with NGOs  
                                                 
17 For a definition of these concepts see page 15. 
18 Organisational capacity to generate own funding or proof of embeddedness in society, e.g. through 
membership numbers can be taken up as funding criteria (Denmark) or accumulation of funding from 
different budget lines can be restricted (UK, Switzerland). Finland and Sweden actually recently decreased 
the portion of funding NGOs have to contribute independently to projects and programs, but also focus a 
lot on NGO activities in the North and development education. 
19  In order to grant NGOs more flexibility and to encourage a strategic approach the UK bases some of its 
funding on the attainment of certain pre-agreed results instead of the implementation of 
projects/programmes.  Another strategy is to agree that a certain percentage of the allocated funding only 
has to be accounted for ex-post (recommendation TMF Netherlands). This makes it possible for NGOs to 
support their partner through core funding. Contributing to basket funding for Southern NGOs can also be 
made possible, by e.g. introducing a condition that local partners‟ capacity must be sufficiently proved by 
the Northern NGO to its back donor (Denmark). 
20 The appraisal of funding proposals can be delegated to an external commission (the Netherlands), an 
NGO umbrella organisation (Finland, Sweden) or a private company (UK, for small projects).   
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Strategy 
Generous funding regarded as an NGO 
entitlement  
Funding must fit into official civil society strategy  
 
 
Support to Southern civil society mainly 
through Northern actors  
 
 
More direct funding of Southern NGOs by bilateral donor  
Large autonomy in the choice of activities  Focus on lobbying21 and advocacy and mainstreaming of 
official aid cross-cutting issues. Service delivery 
interventions must respect Paris Declaration principles22.  
 
Aid strategy based on projects and 
programmes 
Paris Declaration and shift to sector and budget support is 
reflected in requirements related to more strategic approach 
of NGOs. 
 
Some emerging characteristics of the new  donor approach to NGO-funding are 
worth  explaining  in  detail.  Firstly,  donors  are  increasingly  telling  NGOs  where  their  specific 
contribution lies. They do this by circumscribing more explicitly and in more detail than in the 
past  the  roles  of  Northern  NGOs.  In  several  countries,  for  instance,  funding  guidelines 
stipulate  that  proposals  cannot  be  purely  based  on  service  delivery.  Under  the  new  aid 
approach, this is a task that basically befalls the local authorities and civil societies. Service 
delivery activities by Northern NGOs have become somewhat suspect, a relic from a previous 
aid paradigm. They are nevertheless tolerated, even welcomed, provided they are either linked 
to advocacy and a rights-based approach, or have some specific added value, e.g. reaching 
especially  marginalised  groups  or  launching  specific  innovative  approaches.  NGOs  are  also 
increasingly invited to justify in their applications for funding how they themselves define this 
role,  and  how  they  take  into  consideration  the  particular  context  of  the  country  they  are 
working in. On top of all this, NGOs are expected to apply, in service delivery activities, the 
principles  of  the  Paris  Declaration  of  harmonisation  with  other  donors,  and  where  possible 
alignment with the government. 
 
Another evolution that has occurred with regard to NGO roles is that, expect for 
one  (Norway)  all  donors  studied  have  recently  established,  in  consultation  with  the 
organisations, a clear strategy document that specifies how the funding of NGOs fits into the 
general  civil  society  support  strategy  and  bilateral  development  policy.  In  Switzerland  for 
example,  this  policy  document  very  clearly  separates  NGO  roles  in  co-financing  (extensive 
complementarity) from those in subcontracting (intensive complementarity).
23 The elaboration of 
such a shared strategy helps ensure that all NGO funding is based on a strategic vision. 
 
Synergy is also a major objective of all the donors we studied. Most evaluations of 
NGO-funding that were reviewed for this study point to a lack of synergy between bilateral aid 
                                                 
21 Official donors however still often subcontract NGOs for the implementation of service delivery 
components of bilateral aid programs. It is also relevant to mention that it becomes increasingly difficult to 
measure the results of NGO projects and programs when the focus shifts to the more “political” roles of 
NGOs. For example, it is very difficult to measure impact on Southern civil society strengthening.  
22 Some donors subject service delivery interventions to stricter requirements, e.g. with regard to 
alignment with the Southern government and coordination with other actors in the field (Norway), 
harmonisation with the donor agency (UK, the Netherlands) or mandatory combination of service delivery 
with advocacy/lobbying (Denmark, UK, Ireland).  
23 For an explanation of these terms, see page 15.  
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and  officially  funded  NGO  activities.  Often  the  different  actors  are  not  really  aware  of  each 
other‟s  activities  and  NGO  interventions  are  disconnected  from  bi-  and  multilateral  aid.  All 
donors included in this study have undertaken initiatives to encourage synergy. For example, 
they organize consultations between direct and indirect actors, e.g. meetings between sector 
departments and NGOs or between embassies/field delegations and NGOs. It has also become 
common to expect NGOs to harmonise with the funding aid agency when they are active in the 
same country and sector. However, such good intentions, even if included in policy initiatives or 
formalized in guidelines may well only have a limited effect on actual cooperation in the field.  A 
few donors incorporate more binding synergy requirements by linking them to the allocation of 
funds to NGOs. However, the less far-reaching approaches to synergy seem more common. 
 
Most  donors  explicitly  incorporate  a  strategy  on  the  relationship  between 
bilateral sector and geographic allocations and NGO funding in their NGO funding policy. 
They  encourage  NGOs  to  be  active  in  priority  sectors  or  incorporate  cross-cutting  systems 
through financial incentives or theme-based financing. However, none of the donors studied 
requires or gives incentives to NGOs to be active in the bilateral programme countries. They do 
not seem to believe that by forcing indirect actors to work in the same countries and sectors as 
the bilateral agency, synergy will be achieved (on this version of the synergy argument see 
Koch 2007).24 Nor do these donors seem to care much about the inevitable increased statistical 
fragmentation that such poli cies entail.25  Most of the studied donors regard funding through 
NGOs as complementary to bilateral aid even in cases where NGOs cover different countries 
and sectors. This means that they wish to broaden the geographic and/or sector coverage of 
their ODA through NGO funding. This is for example the case for a donor whose selectivity 
policy leads it to focus mainly on “good governance” countries. Such a bilateral donor may wish 
to  use  the  non-governmental  aid  channel  to  cover  the  failed  states  and  poorly  governed 
countries, where it is harder for bilateral aid to be effective.   
 
It may be useful to distinguish two notions of complementarity (see Koch 2007 who 
introduces a similar distinction). With intensive complementarity we refer to situations where 
NGOs and bilateral aid agencies work in the same countries and sectors, closely interact and 
divide tasks according to their respective added value. With extensive complementarity we 
refer to situations where bilateral aid and NGOs complement each other by working in different 
countries  and/or  sectors,  whereby  the  division  of  tasks  is  again  based  on  comparative 
advantage.    The  geographic  extensive  complementarity  view  is  voiced  in  many  policy 
documents  and  evaluations,  but  it  does  not  seem  to  have  been  translated  into  financial 
incentives or funding restrictions for any of the studied donors (see country briefs, and also 
Udsholdt  2008).  This  suggests  that  it  is  expected  that  NGOs  will  follow  this  advice 
                                                 
24 Nor does this seem to be the case in many other DAC countries (DAC 2005a). According to the DAC, 
this lack of harmonisation increases fragmentation and forms a barrier to synergy between the bilateral 
and non-governmental aid channels. One exception known to the authors is Austria, where NGOs can get 
a bigger percentage of a project funded when it is implemented in an Austrian programme country or 
focuses on an Austrian thematic priority (ADC 2007). E.g. for projects, maximum federal funding is at 50% 
for Austrian priority regions and countries and 25% for projects in other areas (ADC 2005). In our own 
country, Belgium, a May 2009 agreement between the government and the NGOs specifies that from 2011 
onwards, NGOs who implement projects can only receive funding for activities in 22 countries (this list 
includes the 18 Belgian partner countries). NGOs who receive programme funding must focus on 50 
countries, the list of which will be decided in mutual agreement between the administration and the 
organisations. This type of concrete specification of the countries for which organisations can request 
funding is quite unusual. 
25 On the other hand, as Koch (2008) argues, expecting NGOs to be active in the same countries as 
bilateral aid could further exacerbate the aid darling/aid orphan divide, especially since NGOs already 
cluster their activities in a too small number of countries.  
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spontaneously, but this may  well be  wishful thinking on the  part of public donors. Empirical 
research does not support the view that NGOs are active in more poorly governed states to a 
greater extent than bilateral donors.26 In fact bilateral agencies and NGOs from the same donor 
country often share the same geographical preferences. 
 
There  seems  to  be  more  steering  from  donors  when  it  comes  to  achieving 
extensive  and  intensive  complementarity  in  the  realm  of  sectors  and  themes.  Thematic 
funding (Netherlands, UK, Denmark) is one way to steer the co-funded activities of the NGOs to 
a larger extent and connect them with official development policy objectives. Thematic funding 
can  be  integrated  into  the  general  funding  modalities  by  e.g.  specifying  that  smaller 
organisations can only request funding for specified themes (Netherlands, Ireland), by launching 
special funding rounds for proposals that relate to certain themes the aid agency has prioritised, 
e.g  HIV/AIDS  or  governance  (Denmark,  UK)  or  by  requiring  project  proposals  to  integrate 
bilateral  cross-cutting  themes  (Ireland).  While  donors  in  the  countries  studied  emphasise 
extensive  more  than  intensive  complementarity,  when  an  NGO  chooses  to  work  in  service 
delivery in the same country and sector as the bilateral donor, strong harmonisation is expected 
(e.g. Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, UK). Sweden for instance requests NGOs to spell out in 
their  proposals  for  bilateral  programme  countries  how  their  activities  relate  to  the  bilateral 
strategy. The extent to which coherence is expected can be made dependent on the type of 
NGO and the type of interventions it implements (recommendation from the evaluation of the 
British PPAs). Switzerland seems to restrict intensive complementarity to subcontracting, and 
does not impose any strict conditions to that effect on its right-of-initiative funding.  
 
When it comes to NGOs’ right of initiative, we generally observe a tendency in all 
of  the  countries  under  study  towards  upholding  this  principle,  but  also  of  ringfencing  it. 
Governments increasingly constrain the way in which NGOs can use government funding (see 
the country briefs in the annex for more detail, and also Agg 2006). NGOs are expected more 
than  in  the  past  to  work  towards  synergy  with  bilateral  aid  policy,  yet  at  the  same  time 
concentrate on their specific roles, to manage aid in accordance with international principles of 
good donorship, and to demonstrate that they can achieve measurable results.  
 
However, this does not mean that NGOs in the countries studied do not operate 
with a considerable degree of autonomy. Especially in the Scandinavian countries, the starting 
position was one of near absolute NGO freedom and autonomy. Although donor agencies in 
these countries are increasingly sharpening the rules for government-funded NGO activities, 
NGOs still enjoy a high freedom of initiative27. It must also be noted that reform of the policy on 
NGO funding generates quite a lot of debate in these countries, and that gradual changes seem 
the only politically feasible option.   
 
In  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK,  the  situation  is  s omewhat  different  from  the 
Scandinavian countries. The Dutch situation has been changing quite rapidly over the last ten 
years. Dutch co-funding agencies used to be legally entitled to a tenth of all ODA, fully funded 
and with few strings attached. Co-funding sums were divided over a restricted number of NGOs 
                                                 
26 For references, see the authors referred to in the country studies. 
27 We came across several suggestions in our literature review that their autonomy is higher than would 
appear from a strict reading of official guidelines, meaning that these guidelines are not always applied 
very strictly or are bended in favour of the NGOs. The desk study approach that we took did not allow us to 
confirm or question these claims.  
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(or umbrella organizations) on the basis of a negotiated formula which was not directly related 
to  performance  but  reflected  the  strength  of  different  ideological  tendencies  within  Dutch 
society.  This  system  has  been  replaced  by  a  new  one  that  is  strongly  competitive  and 
performance-based, with firm steering from the Dutch MFA. In the UK, the NGO support system 
is also explicitly results-based, with strict funding criteria and considerable steering from DFID 
for non-core funding.  
 
These differences can best be understood in their societal and political context. 
The  roles  of  civil  society  organisations  –  developmental  or  not  –  differ  across  countries.  In 
Scandinavia, government-NGO relationships are based on a more consensual, collaborative 
approach with government views on development issues largely similar to those of NGOs. In 
this  particular  tradition  of  the  social  democratic  welfare  state,  the  views  of  civil  society 
organisations  are  highly  valued  and  they  are  regarded  as  partners  to  the  government.  
Supporting NGOs as such is a goal of government policy. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the 
relationship is more distant and can best understood from a principal-agent perspective, with 
funding essentially justified on the basis of the effectiveness of NGOs (Lindahl et al. 1999). 
These different societal models define the parameters of feasible approaches to NGO funding. 
What works in one country is not necessarily a good model for another. Yet some borrowing 
seems to be taking place: the Netherlands seem recently to have been more inspired by the 
Anglo-Saxon model and have moved away from the Scandinavian model. 
 
The approach donor agencies take towards NGO autonomy depends or should 
depend  on  what  they  wish  to  achieve  through  such  NGO  support.  When  strengthening 
(Southern) civil society, or when enhancing organisational capacity is the main goal, long-term 
flexible core or institutional funding may be the advisable strategy (support to NGOs). When 
NGO funding is instrumental in achieving a specific (sector) objective or an MDG, results-based 
funding based on detailed requirements and goals is probably more suitable (support through 
NGOs). The flexibility of NGO funding is thus ideally dependent on the objectives the donor 
agency wishes to attain. Donors are therefore advised to differentiate more clearly between 
these  types  of  support  (Scanteam  2007).  Appropriate  funding  modalities  can  be  best 
designed when a NGO strategy on which to base them is in place. 
 
In the light of the shift to budget support and the increasing focus on ownership 
and alignment it is at first sight surprising that the donors in our study did not shift towards core 
funding of Northern NGOs. This would make alignment to local partners‟ priorities more feasible 
and encourage organisational capacity building. One could argue that this lack of enthusiasm 
for core funding constitutes a discrepancy with the current trends in bilateral aid (budget support 
~ core funding). If anything, NGO funding tends to shift from core funding towards stricter ex 
ante  conditions  and  in  some  cases  some  earmarking.  Bilateral  donors  do  not  want  to 
„instrumentalize‟  Northern  NGOs,  in  the  sense  of  taking  away  their  autonomy.  There  is  for 
instance  no  indication  that  sub-contracting  is  replacing  right-of-initiative  funding.  But  donors 
want assurances that Northern NGOs adhere to a jointly agreed strategy and are effective in 
their use of tax payers money. Intriguingly, public donors move towards more core funding in 
their support to Southern NGOs, usually through pooled funds from different donors (Scanteam 
2007). And they support Northern NGOs to do likewise, but they do not seem to believe that 
providing core funding to Northern NGOs is the best way to achieve that end. This is actually 
confirmed  in  the  literature.  Often  Northern  NGOs  do  not  offer  the  same  long-term,  flexible 
funding to their partners as they themselves receives from their back donors (Koch 2008a). So  
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rather than provide core funding to Northern NGOs, donors seem to prefer to include a number 
of  control  and  incentive  mechanisms  in  programmatic  funding  that  leaves  the  NGO  with 
considerable autonomy but also induces the NGO to act in ways which are in line with the 
overall aid strategy, including eventually core funding to their Southern partners. 
 
Although Northern NGOs are kept on a shorter leash than was sometimes the case 
before, they on the other hand benefit from more flexible and long term funding, on the basis of 
results-based  agreements,  which  do  not  incorporate  a  detailed  description  of  inputs  and 
activities. Almost all the donors studied have moved from project-funding to a greater focus on a 
programmatic approach, often in some form of “framework agreements”.  This evolution started 
back  in  the  1970s,  but  there  have  been  further  changes  in  many  countries.  Framework  or 
partnership agreements are now favoured, amounting to long-term (3-6 years) support to one or 
several  NGOs  that  have  been  selected  through  an  organisational  assessment.  The  funding 
tends to be programmatic, insists on a financial contribution from the NGO itself (co-funding), is 
increasingly  results-based,  but  otherwise  grants  NGOs  considerable  flexibility  in 
implementation. Such agreements are often also viewed as conducive to the strengthening of 
the  partnership  relationship  between  the  bilateral  donor  and  the  NGO  as  they  incorporate 
frequent policy dialogue. In recognition of the diversity of the Northern NGO landscape, and 
inspired  by  a  desire  to  also  fund  projects  from  smaller  NGOs  where  the  same  tough 
organisational standards cannot be expected, many donors have also installed a special budget 
line for projects from smaller NGOs, sometimes funded indirectly through some intermediary, 
often an NGO umbrella organisation. 
 
 
In conclusion, Northern NGO right of initiative is still a major feature of co-funding 
but  has  become  less  absolute.  Conditions  and  steering  from  aid  agencies  have  increased, 
especially  but  not  only  in  service  delivery  and  stand-alone  projects.  These  new  conditions 
however do not instrumentalise NGOs. Rather, they encourage NGOs to act as good donors in 
their  own  right,  and  provide  them  the  necessary  latitude  to  do  so.  Donors  are  increasingly 
entering into framework agreements with NGOs, which offer long-term, flexible, results-based 
funding to organisations with sufficient organisational capacity. We could therefore state that in 
many respects, NGOs have lost the autonomy to do as they please, while on the other hand, 
they receive the opportunity to use funding in a less rigid way, and therefore are able to better 
fulfil their unique and distinct roles. A lot of donors have launched flexible funding schemes 
which give NGOs the opportunity to engage in longer term, core funding of local NGOs. The 
goal  of  these  funding  schemes  is  also  to  lessen  the  administrative  burden  engendered  by 
project funding and transform the bilateral donor - Northern NGO relationship into a more policy-
based  partnership.  At  the  same  time,  most  donors  have  created  special  budget  lines  for 
organisations that are of a smaller size and for whom project funding is more suitable. This type 
of funding is generally more restricted. 
 
 
4.   NGO FUNDING MODALITIES: THE UNDERLYING MODEL  
 
 
When during the 1970s co-financing of NGOs became a standard feature of most 
donors‟ aid policy, the thinking about aid effectiveness was very different from today. Project aid 
was the major aid modality,  and donors were actively involved in implementation. As social  
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service delivery projects could only address the needs for a relatively small group of people at a 
time, and needs were huge, a diversified approach were a donor might finance hundreds of 
projects  at  the  same  time  was  not  considered  problematic,  on  the  contrary.  NGOs  were 
considered especially interesting project implementers because of their proximity to the poor, 
their commitment and low cost, and their participatory approaches. Gradually project funding 
was replaced by more programmatic funding to the more experienced NGOs, thus reducing the 
administrative burden on the public donor and providing more flexibility to the NGOs. Since the 
apparition of the so-called new aid approach around the turn of the century, the perspective on 
what  constitutes  good  aid  modalities,  and  how  NGOs  in  particular  fit  into  the  picture,  has 
changed fairly dramatically. It is not surprising then that co-financing mechanisms are being 
redrafted in many countries. All the eight donors we studied are envisaging or have already 
implemented important revisions in their relations with the NGOs. 
 
The eight donors we studied did not use the same blueprint for reforming NGO 
funding. The efforts are country and donor specific, yet they share a common understanding 
about how Northern NGOs could play unique but refashioned roles as development actors. This 
understanding is based on the new aid paradigm itself. The new funding relations on the one 
hand grant autonomy and flexibility to Northern NGOs, but on the other hand attach strings and 
restrictions in order to hold NGOs accountable and force them to deliver on what they are good 
at,  keeping  to  their  unique  niche,  and  respecting  the  principles  of  good  donorship  that  are 
embedded in the DAC 2005 Paris Declaration. We summarise this common understanding in 
the following three points. 
 
4.1.  Be part of the grand scheme 
 
NGOs  are  expected  to  share  in  the  broad  policy  objectives  of  bilateral  donors 
which they, as Northern civil society, have helped to shape. In various ways donors remind 
them  of  this  in  the  reformed  funding  mechanisms.  They  are  supposed  to  select  countries, 
sectors, thematic approaches in such a way that they contribute to the shared development 
strategy. When it comes to service delivery, being part of the grand scheme also means that 
NGOs are supposed to accept the principles of the Paris Declaration, in particular, that national 
governments have prime responsibility in this respect, and that foreign donors, where possible, 
align  to  national  strategies  and  implementation.  NGOs  are  requested  to  indicate,  in  their 
application for funding, how they take the strategic priorities of the PRSP into account and how 
they harmonise with other donors (non-governmental and official, not necessarily or only the 
bilateral  donor  they  get  funding  from).  They  must  indicate  how  they  avoid  unnecessary 
fragmentation, and how their aid efforts take into consideration what other donors are doing. 
Synergy with bilateral aid has to be shown, although there is plenty of leeway in how this is 
implemented. NGOs can opt for extensive complementarity. If however they work in the same 
countries  and  sectors  as  the  bilateral  donor,  then  they  are  expected  to  allow  for  intensive 
complementarity, by consulting with the bilateral donor, and by engaging in mutually reinforcing 
strategies. 
 
4.2.  Be autonomous and different 
 
One of the unique features of Northern NGOs is that they are part of their own civil 
society, and have contacts and popular roots that allow them to address the issue of popular 
support for development cooperation. Bilateral donors also have responsibility in this respect,  
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but their efforts and those of NGOs to convince the public that development cooperation is a 
duty and can be meaningful are seen as complementary. For Northern NGOs to take on this 
responsibility, it is important that they have effective “roots” in their society. The danger of co-
financing is that it allows well-meaning NGO technocrats to build up strong expertise, yet to 
remain  disconnected  from  the  general  public  in  their  own  societies.  One  test  of  the 
embeddedness of Northern NGOs is whether they can mobilise financial support among the 
general public. For this reason, donors now tend to attach more importance than in the past to 
the level of own financing that Northern NGOs can provide. Donors are therefore anxious to 
avoid supporting Northern NGOs to such an extent that they become exclusively dependent on 
them for financial support. 
 
A  second  feature  of  Northern  NGOs  is  that  as  civil  society  actors  they  can 
approach their partners in the South on a different footing than bilateral donors can. Northern 
NGOs have a special responsibility to strengthen Southern NGOs and other actors of Southern 
civil society, both financially, and through efforts at capacity building. If is further acknowledged 
that civil society, in the North and the South, has a role to play as watchdog. In the new aid 
paradigm,  downward  accountability  of  partner  governments  to  their  own  citizens  is  key  to 
success, and bilateral donors cannot impose it. Northern NGOs can help support their Southern 
partners, with moral support, protection through international lobbying, financially, and through 
capacity building, so that the latter can claim such downward accountability with more success. 
 
In order for Northern NGOs to take on these responsibilities, they need to have a 
fair  degree  of  autonomy  from  the  bilateral  donor,  and  not  be  seen  as  just  instruments  of 
implementation for bilateral programmes. All the donors studied are sensitive to this issue, and 
NGOs  themselves  are  more  than  happy  to  remind  them  of  this  crucial  dimension.  Finally, 
Northern NGOs play a special role in humanitarian aid, but this is an aspect that tends to be 
treated differently from structural, long-term support, and we have not given any prominence to 
this dimension in this study. 
 
4.3.  Be professional 
 
Although donors are willing to grant Northern NGOs, within the overall setting of a 
joint strategy, the right of initiative and a fair degree of autonomy in implementation, this does 
not (or no longer) mean that  NGOs can  do  as they see fit. The principles  of  results-based 
management also apply to them. NGOs must be able to show with a reasonable degree of 
precision how their activities have attained the impact that was expected.  This also means, 
inevitably, that they must be able to measure what they aim to achieve. Because of all this, core 
funding  is not  the  normal funding  instrument applied to Northern NGOs, although  in certain 
circumstances it has an important place to fulfil. In general donors prefer flexible but at the 
same time sufficiently binding funding principles. Donors are aware that rigorous financial and 
reporting  requirements  can  act  as  a  drag  on  flexible  support  to  Southern  nongovernmental 
partners, so they allow Northern NGOs to be less restricted by bureaucratic red tape, yet they 
want at the same time they wish to make sure that Northern NGOs act as responsible donors. 
Bilateral donors will therefore try to impose such conditions that enable the Northern NGO to be 
flexible  and  reasonable  towards  its  Southern  partner,  yet  at  the  same  time  competent  and 
effective. 
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It is difficult to keep Northern NGOs sufficiently on their toes if they have a quasi-
monopoly situation in access to funding. For this reason, some donors give clear signals to their 
client NGOs that funding is not automatic, and that room must be made to new entrants, also 
implying that established NGOs are not automatically assured of continued funding. In reality 
bilateral  donors  seem  to  be  softer  on  NGOs  than  they  pretend.  Nevertheless,  the  idea  of 
offering sanctioned NGOs some financial parachute is interesting because it makes the threat of 
sanctions, even if seldom applied, more credible and gives the organisation the opportunity to 
adapt in order to meet funding requirements. 
 
 
5.     CONCLUSION: UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
 
As  we  indicated  before,  bilateral  donors  have  been  driving  the  reform  in  NGO 
funding. This is in contrast with for instance the transition from project to programme funding 
from the 1970s onwards,  when both the bilateral donors and Northern NGOs were keen to 
promote such reform. Northern NGOs seem to have largely accepted the reforms, but that does 
not mean that there are no areas of dispute. In fact, there are several areas where NGOs and 
bilateral  donors  remain  on  opposite  sides  of  the  fence.  One  such  area  is  the  financing  of 
Southern NGOs. Bilateral donors who espouse the new aid approach, as to variable extents is 
the case for all the countries studied, increasingly engage in direct funding or Southern NGOs 
and other actors of  local civil society. Such financing is handled by the embassies/delegations 
in the field, and increasingly donors try to pool resources in this respect, as described above. 
But Northern NGOs sometimes contest this direct funding, arguing that public donors are poorly 
placed to provide such support, for political as much as for managerial reasons. They feel that 
they are in a much better position to do this, and that bilateral donors  should not try to get 
involved directly in such support.  
 
Another area of tension is who gets access to Northern lines of funding. It is quite 
natural that NGOs from the donor country concerned are the major beneficiaries, but it is being 
questioned  if  this  should  be  to  the  exclusion  of  NGOs  from  other  Northern  countries,  truly 
international NGOs (such as Action Aid, which has its HQ in South Africa) or Southern NGOs. 
Northern NGOs obviously are more comfortable if they do not have to share with NGOs from 
other countries, but in several countries donors are putting this form of aid tying into question.
28 
 
The increasing focus on measurable results and impact is understandable, but if 
not  handled  carefully,  might  put  unreasonable  demands  on  NGOs  that  in  the  end  will 
discourage them from undertaking some of the social and political tasks bilateral donors wish to 
support.  Here again some tension exists. The problem is that it is much more difficult to 
measure empowerment of a local NGO than it is to measure bags of rice. Such social and 
political effects cannot be measured through the direct outputs and short-term tangible results of 
NGO projects and programs (Thomas 2008). The pressure to report results may end up in 
encouraging NGOs to undertake risk-evasive strategies (e.g. working in better governed states, 
or places where there is already an organisational network present, less targeting of the poorest 
segments of the population) and focus more on service delivery (where tangible results are 
easier to achieve) (Bebbington 2005, Fowler 2000). This may undermine the innovative role that 
                                                 
28 E.g. in the Netherlands, where non-Dutch organisations can now compete for co-funding on the same 
budget line as Dutch organisations.  
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donors expect Northern NGOs to play. Koch (2008b) recommends that aid agencies provide 
NGOs with the incentives to work in risky environments, i.a. by making less strict demands on 
short-term impact in these kind of settings.
29  
 
Importantly, upward accountability relationships between Northern NGOs and their 
back donors are mirrored in the partnership relation between Northern NGOs and their partners 
in the South. Increasing bureaucratisation and emphasis on reporting of quantifiable results in 
donor-imposed formats have the potential of distor ting this partner relationship (Bebbington 
2005, Wallace et al. 2007).  
 
Have  the  reforms  that  we  have  described  in  this  report  reached  their  final 
conclusion, or are still in the middle of a process that has to go through more stages? We do not 
know the answer to this question, but it seems to us that we have not yet seen the end of the 
reform. Northern NGOs are formidable lobbies, and have a huge following among parliaments 
and public opinion. One senses, throughout the evaluations and studies, that quite   some 
experts and aid officials would want to go further along the road already travelled, and that the 
end is not yet in sight. The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway will in any case emit new civil 
society policies or guidelines soon.  
                                                 
29 Koch (2009) however found that more marketised co-funding systems do not necessarily result in risk-
evasive behaviour from NGOs, and that on the contrary, NGOs who received funding in less competitive 
systems were less inclined to work in poorly performing states.  
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SUMMARISING TABLE : AN OVERVIEW OF MODALITIES AND GUIDELINES FOR NGO FUNDING IN THE STUDIED COUNTRIES 
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34 Koch 2008, IDS 2004. 
35 This information for the Netherlands is based on the speech of Koenders of November 2008, which sets out the main features of the future Dutch NGO policy. 
36 IDS 2004.  
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assistance strategies.  service delivery 
projects with 
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37 DAC 2003b, figure seems to optimistic however as Irish Aid requests NGOs to be no more than 70-75 % dependent on government financing when applying for funds. 
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